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Abstract
Unlike traditional open-source projects, developers of open-source blockchain-based projects
can reap large financial rewards thanks to a modern form of seignorage. I study to what
extent this novel form of financing generates incentives to innovate. I consider a developer
working on an open-source blockchain-based protocol that can be used only in conjunction
with a protocol-specific crypto-token. This token is first sold to investors via an auction
(the ICO phase) and then traded on a frictionless financial market. I establish that seignor-
age is effective at providing capital and at generating incentives to develop the protocol.
Its effectiveness is however limited by the fact that, in all equilibria of the game, in each
post-ICO period there is a positive probability that the developer sells all his tokens and,
as a consequence, no development occurs.
JEL classification: D25, O31, L17, L22, L26, E42, E51,
Keywords: Blockchain, decentralized ledger technologies, Initial Coin Offering (ICO),
seignorage, innovation, incentives, open source.
1 Introduction
This paper studies a new mechanism for the financing of software development:
seignorage. Seignorage allows the developer of a blockchain-based open-source soft-
ware to rip a direct financial benefit (in addition to indirect benefits derived from,
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for example, career concerns)1 via the creation of a token that must be used in
conjunction with the software.
Historically, seigniorage are profits earned by a government by issuing a currency.
As the economic activity within a country increases, the value of the currency used
in this country also increases, and with it the profit earned by the government issuing
this currency. The same mechanism allows developers of open-source blockchain-
based projects to benefit from their work. As an illustration, consider a population
of agents who wishes to transact but are prevented from doing so for lack of the
required infrastructure. For example, these agents may want to exchange a physical
good, but there may be no legal system, no agreed upon units of measurement,
no security. Alternatively, the exchange may be between computers, in which case
the technical specifications governing the communication between machines may be
missing. An entrepreneur may decide to invest resources and create this missing
infrastructure, and, with it, a market. One way to profit from this investment is to
create a token, and establish that all exchanges occurring within the market must
use this token. All prices within the market can be expressed in fiat currency (that
is, in some numeraire), but must be paid using the token. The entrepreneur owns
the initial stock of tokens and can credibly commit to limit their supply. It follows
that if the market is successful, there will be a positive demand for these tokens, a
positive price for tokens, and positive profits earned by the entrepreneur.
The way blockchain allows for the creation of this infrastructure and the ability
of the entrepreneur to extract profits is threefold (see Section 1 for some details of
how blockchain works). First, blockchain technology can be used to create the in-
frastructure and therefore the marketplace.2 Second, the rules determining whether
1 On the motivation of contributors to open source projects, see the seminal work by Lerner and
Tirole (2002).
2 It may appear that not all blockchain projects have this “marketplace” element. For example,
the existence of “two sides who want to transact” is not immediately evident when considering the
Bitcoin protocol. However, also in this case there are two sides: people who need to exchange
bitcoins, and those who use their computers to process these transactions also called miners. Users
of bitcoins “pay” the miners in two ways. One is direct: the sender of bitcoins can pay a fee to
process the transaction faster, and this fee is earned by the miner. The second is indirect: the
network awards miners new bitcoins for their work. Because of its effect on the price, this increase
in the supply of bitcoins amounts to a transfers from the holders of bitcoins to the miners. See also
Huberman, Leshno, and Moallemi (2017). The case of Bitcoin also illustrates another point: that
the mechanism by which one side of the market rewards the other may not be a market-clearing
price. This aspect, however, will not be relevant here.
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(and how) the supply of tokens increases over time can be fully specified initially
and cannot be manipulated afterward. That is, using blockchain technology the
entrepreneurs can commit to a specific supply of tokens. Finally, the fact that a
given token is necessary to transact is also specified within the protocol. That is, it
is not possible to use the same protocol with a different token.3
This paper studies theoretically seignorage as a form of financing for open-source
software, both in its ability to generate incentives for innovation beyond those al-
ready discussed in the literature on open source software, and in its ability to provide
capital to be invested in the development of the software. I build a model in which,
in every period, a developer exerts effort and invests in the development of a soft-
ware. Initially, the developer owns the entire stock of tokens, and can sell some to
investors via an auction (also called Initial Coin Offering—ICO). Subsequently, in
every period he can sell or buy tokens on a frictionless market for tokens, in which
both users of the software and investors are active. The developer can use the pro-
ceedings of the sale of tokens to either invest in the development of the software or
to consume.
The main insight is that, if investors are price takers, then in any post-ICO period
there is an anti-coordination problem. If investors expect the developer to develop
the software in the future, this expectation should be priced into the token’s current
price. But if this is the case, then the developer is strictly better off by selling
all his tokens, which allows him to “cash in” on the future development without
doing any. On the other hand, if investors expect no development to occur, the
price of the token will be low. The developer should hold on as many tokens as
possible, exert effort and invest in the development of the protocol so to increase
the future price of the token. In every post-ICO period, therefore, the equilibrium
is in mixed strategy: the price of the token is such that the developer is indifferent
between selling all his tokens (and therefore stop developing the protocol) or keeping
a strictly positive amount of tokens (and therefore continuing the development of
the protocol). The developer randomizes between these two options, in a way that
leaves investors indifferent between purchasing tokens in any given period.
The equilibrium at ICO is instead in pure strategies. The important point is
that, if the ICO is an auction, then the fraction of the total supply of tokens sold
3 Of course, it is always possible to modify the source code of the software to accept a different
token, therefore creating a “fork”: a new software, with its own development, incompatible with
the initial software.
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by the developer is announced initially. Because the incentives to exert effort and
invest in the development of the software increase with the share of tokens held by
the developer, investors can anticipate the amount of development that will occur
in the period following the ICO, which will be reflected in the price of the token at
ICO.
In addition, both at ICO and post-ICO there may be a coordination problem.
Because of a cash constraint, in every period the developer cannot invest in the
development of the software more than his assets. It follows that the developer
may sell some of his tokens, as a way to accumulate assets and finance the future
development of the software. The number of tokens that the developer needs to
sell in order to finance future investments depends on the current price for tokens,
therefore generating a coordination problem. If the price is high, the developer
needs to sell few tokens and his incentives to invest and develop the software in the
future are high. This, in turn, justifies the high price for tokens today. If instead
the price today is low, in order to finance future development the developer needs
to sell many tokens. But then his incentives to develop the software will be low,
which justifies the fact that the price is low today. Therefore at ICO there could
be multiple pure-strategy Nash equilibria, while post ICO there could be multiple
mixed-strategy Nash equilibria.4
When choosing whether and when to hold an ICO the developer is therefore
facing a tradeoff. If he holds an ICO, in all subsequent periods he may sell all
his tokens and therefore not develop the software. Postponing the ICO therefore
prevents the creation of a market for tokens and works as a commitment device,
because the developer will hold all his tokens for sure and set the corresponding
level of effort and investment. On the other hand, if the developer does not sell
tokens at ICO he may lack the funds to invest efficiently in the development of the
protocol. As a consequence, the developer never wants to hold an ICO if his own
assets are sufficient to finance the optimum level of investment in the development
of the protocol, but may hold the ICO as soon as his own funds are not sufficient to
achieve the efficient level of investment.
4 Clearly, if there are network effects, then there is an additional coordination problem: for given
sequence of effort and investment by the developer, there is a coordination problem among users,
possibly leading to the existence of a “high adoption” and “low adoption” equilibria. The novelty
here is that fixing one of the adoption equilibria, there are multiple equilibrium sequence of effort
and investment arising from a coordination problem between investors and the developer.
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Relevant literature. This paper contributes to the literature on innovation and
incentives, in particular to the literature studying the motivation behind contribu-
tions to open source software (see the seminal paper by Lerner and Tirole, 2002).
With this respect, I show that open source—with its organizational structure and
ethos—can coexist with strong financial incentives. Of course, an open question
that I do not address here is whether financial rewards will crowd out other motives
(see, for example, Benabou and Tirole, 2003), that is, whether the open source ethos
will be compromised by the introduction of strong financial incentives.
Gans and Halaburda (2015) study platform based digital currencies such as Face-
book credits and Amazon coins. These currencies share some similarities with the
tokens discussed in the introduction, because they can be used to perform exchanges
on a specific platform. They are, however, controlled by their respective platforms,
which decide on their supply and the extent to which they can be traded or ex-
changed. This may explain why, despite some initial concerns,5 these currencies
neither gained wide adoption, nor generated significant profits for the platform is-
suing them.
There is a small but growing literature studying specific blockchain-based projects,
mostly bitcoin and its blockchain (see, for example Athey, Parashkevov, Sarukkai,
and Xia, 2017, Huberman, Leshno, and Moallemi, 2017, Dimitri, 2017, Biais, Bisiere,
Bouvard, and Casamatta, 2018, Prat and Walter, 2018, Ma, Gans, and Tourky,
2018). Catalini and Gans (2016) discusses the broader economic implications of
blockchain (that is, beyond specific projects). These papers do not discuss seignor-
age as a way to finance blockchain-based projects.
A line of literature that is also related is the one studying how the financial
market may weaken incentive schemes faced by managers (see, for example, the
seminal work by Diamond and Verrecchia, 1982 and the most recent Bisin, Gottardi,
and Rampini, 2008, Acharya and Bisin, 2009). The reason is that, also in my model,
the possibility of trading on the financial market reduces the incentives to exert effort
and invest. The environment I’m considering here is however different from the one
considered in these papers, because a token is a currency that may be used in the
5 See, for example “Could a gigantic nonsovereign like Facebook someday launch a real currency
to compete with the dollar, euro, yen and the like?” by Matthew Yglesias on Slate, February 29,
2012 (available at http://www.slate.com/articles/business/cashless_society/2012/02/facebook_
credits_how_the_social_network_s_currency_could_compete_with_dollars_and_euros_
.html).
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future and hence acquire value. That is, there is no contract between the issuer of
the currency (the developer) and those holding the currency (the investors).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Because seignorage as a
mechanism for financing innovation is specific to blockchain-based projects, the next
section provides some background on blockchain. Section 3 presents a model of
seignorage, which is solved in Section 4. Section 5 discusses some extensions to the
model. Section 6 concludes. Unless otherwise noted, all proofs and mathematical
derivations missing from the text are in appendix.
2 Blockchain
Blockchain is better understood in relation to Internet. The Internet protocol suite
(commonly known as TCP/IP) was developed in the late ’60 and early ’70 to allow
for the decentralized transmission of data, that is, transmission of data via a network
of computers in which no node is, individually, essential to the well functioning of the
network. It is the technological foundation of a second set of protocols (also called
application layer protocols) handling specific types of data: HTTP for accessing web
pages; SMTP, POP, and IMAP for sending and receiving emails; FTP for sending
receiving files; and so on.
Blockchain is a recent innovation that further expands the operations that can
be performed by a network of computers. It is a protocol that allows for the decen-
tralized transmission of data (as does the Internet protocol suite), as well as for the
decentralized storage, verification, manipulation of data.6 Similarly to the way the
Internet protocol suite is the foundation of a number of application-layer protocols,
blockchain is the technological foundation of a number of application-layer protocols.
The most well-known is the Bitcoin protocol: a protocol allowing a network of com-
puters to store data (how many Bitcoin each address owns) and to enforce specific
rules regarding how these data can be manipulated (no double spending). Numerous
other blockchain-based protocols currently exist or are being actively developed. For
example, protocols for building applications that can run on a decentralized network
6 Sometimes a distinction is made between blockchain and decentralized ledger technologies,
where blockchain refers to a specific way to maintain a decentralized ledger. This distinction is
not relevant for the purpose of this paper. Another distinction is between “blockchain” meaning
the technology, and “the blockchain” meaning a specific application of the blockchain technology,
usually the Bitcoin blockchain.
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(rather than on a specific computer, see Ethereum, Tezor, Ardor, NTX); protocols
for decentralized real-time gross settlement (see Ripple, Stellar); protocols enabling
the creation of decentralized marketplace for storage and hosting of files (see SIA,
Filecoin, Storj) and for renting in/out CPU cycles (see Golem, Gridcoin); protocols
creating fully decentralized prediction markets (see Augur, Gnosis, Stox), financial
exchanges (see 0xproject), and financial derivatives (see MakerDAO); and many
more.
An important difference between the protocols built on TCP/IP and those built
on blockchain is the way in which their developers are rewarded. The vast majority of
protocols based on TCP/IP are opensource, free to adopt and use. The contributors
to these projects are not organized in a single, traditional company, but rather form a
loosely-defined group around one (or multiple) project leader and are based on open
collaboration (as typical of open source projects). They do not receive immediate,
direct financial compensation for their contributions, and are motivated by career
concerns (i.e. increase their reputation and reap a financial benefit in the future)
and by non-monetary considerations (i.e. the pleasure of sharing, collaborating,
contributing to a public good). Instead, as already discussed in the introduction,
the development of blockchain-based protocols can leverage financial incentives via
seignorage. The remainder of the paper studies the effectiveness of seignorage in
generating incentives for innovation.
3 The model
The economy is composed of a developer, a large mass of risk-neutral price-taking
investors, and a large mass of users. At the beginning of every period t ≥ 1, the
developer exerts effort et and invests it into the development of a Blockchain-based
protocol. At the end of every period the developer consumes ct ≥ 0. The sequence
of investment and effort determines the value of the protocol in each period t:
Vt = max
{
t∑
s=1
f(es, is)
}
(1)
representing the total monetary value of the transactions made using the protocol
during a given period. The function f(., .) is increasing in both arguments, concave
in et, with limi→∞
{
∂f(et,it)
∂it
}
= 0 for all et. All transactions that use the protocol
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must be conducted using a specific token, with total supply M , fully owned by the
developer at the beginning of the game.
Note that, although quite general, the above specification abstracts away from
a possible coordination problem in the adoption phase of the protocol. That is,
because of network externalities, it is possible that for given sequence of effort and
investment there are both a “high adoption” equilibrium in which the value of the
protocol is high, and a “low adoption” equilibrium in which the value of the protocol
is low. With a minimal loss of generality, the reader can interpret Vt as the value
of the protocol in one of these equilibria, the one that the developer expects to
emerge.7
Timeline. The development of the protocol lasts T periods, after which the devel-
oper exists the game and the protocol continues being used indefinitely. In period
to ≤ T , the developer sells some tokens to investors via an auction. I call this stage
the ICO (Initial Coin Offering) stage, and I assume that its date to is chosen by the
developer.8 In each period t ∈ {to + 1, ..., T}, first the developer exerts effort and
invests, and then a frictionless market for tokens opens. In period t = T , after the
developer exerts effort and invests, and after the market for tokens has open, users
can use the protocol. At the end of period T the developer exists the game. In
every subsequent period (that is, in every t > T ), first the market for tokens opens,
and then users use the protocol. See Figure 1 for a graphical representation of the
timeline.
Investors. Investors are risk-neutral profit maximizers with no cash constraints.
They can purchase tokens in every period and sell them during any subsequence
period. Importantly, when buying or selling tokens on the market they are price
takers: their net demand for tokens in period t depends on the sequence of token’s
prices from period t onward, which they take as given. Because they do not discount
7 The loss of generality is that either the “high” or the ”low“ adoption equilibrium may not
exist for some levels of efforts and investments, generating a discontinuity in the way effort and
investment maps into the value of the protocol.
8 The important element of an auction is that the number of tokens sold is fixed initially by the
auctioneer and the price is determined endogenously via the investors’ bid. In practice, however,
not all ICOs follow this format. See, for example, the practice of holding uncapped ICOs in which
the token’s price is fixed and the number of tokens sold initially is determined in equilibrium. The
results derived in this paper do not extend to these types of ICOs.
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1 ≤ t < to (pre ICO)
t+ 1
effort et
investment it
consumption ct
t = to (ICO)
t+ 1
effort et
investment it
consumption ct
Auction for tokens
to ≤ t < T (post ICO)
t+ 1
effort et
investment it
consumption ct
Market for tokens opens
t = T
t+ 1
Market for tokens opens
Users use the protocol
effort et
investment it
consumption ct
the developer exits
t > T
t+ 1
Users use the protocol
Market for tokens opens
Fig. 1: Timeline
the future, investors are indifferent between purchasing any amount of tokens in
period t whenever pt = p¯t ≡ maxs>t {E[ps]}, where p¯t is therefore the largest future
expected price. If instead pt > p¯, then the investors’ demand for tokens in period
t is zero.9 Finally, if pt < p¯ then the investors’ demand for token in period t is not
9 I’m therefore abstracting away from short-selling. This is without loss of generality. The
reason is that to short sell, an investor should borrow a token, sell it, and then return it to the
owner in a later period. As I discuss in the next paragraph, users are prevented by assumption
from deciding intertemporarily when they want to use the token, and hence cannot lend tokens.
Furthermore, if the price is expected to drop, neither the developer nor other other investors will
want to lend tokens, preferring instead to sell them when the price is high.
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defined.
Users. In every period t ≥ T users use the protocol to exchange goods and services
of value Vt. Given the assumed timing, those who use the protocol to purchase goods
and services in period t have a demand for tokens in period t equal to Vt
pt
. Instead,
those who use the protocol to sell goods or services have a supply of tokens in period
t + 1 equal to Vt
pt
. The mass of users on the selling and buying side of the protocol
are assumed constant.10
The developer. Call Qt ≤ M the stock of tokens held by the developer at the
beginning of period t, with Q0 = M . Call
At ≡ a+
t−1∑
s=0
[(Qs −Qs+1) · ps − is] = At−1 − it−1 + pt−1(Qt−1 −Qt)
the total resources available to the developer at the beginning of period t, where a
are the developer’s initial assets (cash) and the rest are resources earned from the
sale of tokens in previous periods, net of the investments made. To account for the
fact that during periods t < to the developer cannot sell tokens, I impose that pt ≡ 0
for all t < to. Intuitively, in any t < to the developer cannot sell tokens but can
destroy them, which is equivalent to selling them at price zero. Of course, this will
not happen in equilibrium.
In period t, the developer’s optimization problem is:
Ut(Qt, At) ≡ max{Qt+1,...},{et,et+1,...},{it,it+1,...}
{
T∑
s=t
(
cs − 1
2
e2s
)}
subject to the budget constraint:
ct = At + (Qt −Qt+1) · pt − it ≥ 0,
a feasibility constraint determining the largest investment that can be made:
it ≤ At,
10 It is important to point out that the same person could purchase tokens both to buy/sell
using the protocol, and as investment. The important element is that the demand for tokens can
be decomposed into two motives (i.e. usage and investment); the fact that each of this motive
originates from a distinct type of agents is for ease of exposition.
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and a cash constraint determining the maximum amount of tokens that can be
purchased by the developer
pt max {Qt+1 −Qt, 0} ≤ At − it.
Note that the cash constraint is always tighter than the liquidity constraint, which
can therefore be disregarded. The sequence of effort, investments and Qt are as-
sumed observable by investors and users at the beginning of each period. The
developer understands the price formation mechanism.
4 Solution
4.1 Periods t ≥ T .
In this section I show that, given the set up of the model and an appropriate equilib-
rium selection criterion (which I introduce below), the price of the token in period
T is strictly increasing in the value of the protocol VT—and hence in the sequence
of effort and investments made by the developer. It is important to keep in mind,
however, that the solution to developer’s problem will depend exclusively on the fact
that pT is strictly increasing in VT , while the details of how VT affects pT will be rel-
evant only to derive closed-form solutions. That is, the model is robust to different
assumptions about what happen from period T onward (for example, regarding the
demand and supply of tokens by users or by investors), provided that under these
different assumptions pT is increasing in VT .
The presence of the investors and the fact that no development is possible after
period T implies that the price of the token must be constant from period T onward.
Investors are therefore indifferent between holding cash and holding the token, which
implies that there are multiple equilibria: the price of the token will depend on the
stock of tokens held by the investors, who are indifferent between holding any level
of tokens.
To break this indeterminacy I impose the following assumption:
Assumption 1. In equilibrium the stock of tokens held by investors from period
t ≥ T is γ ·M for γ ∈ [0, 1).
That is, out of the many equilibria possible, here I am interested in those in which
the demand for tokens by investors is a constant fraction of the stock of tokens M .
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The term γ ·M therefore represents the “speculative” demand for tokens: the
demand for tokens driven by the expectation that future investors will also demand
γ ·M . Next to this demand, in every period there is a demand and a supply for
tokens originating from users. Because the stock of tokens available to users is
(1− γ) ·M , the price for token must solve:11
pT =
VT
(1− γ)M .
The important observation here is that the price at which the developer can sell his
tokens in period T is strictly increasing in the value of the protocol VT , and therefore
in the prior sequence of effort and investments.
4.2 The developer’s problem.
The fact that the price of the token in period T is increasing in the sequence of effort
and investments made by the developer generates the following tension. Investors
are forward looking and are willing to purchase tokens in period t < T at the same
price that is expected in period T . But if the developer’s future effort is already
priced into todays’ price, the developer may be better off by selling all his tokens—
that is, to benefit from his future effort and investment before exerting any. This
section shows that, as a consequence of this tension, the game has mixed strategy
equilibria in which, in every period with some probability the developer sells all his
tokens.
Because investors are price takers, their demand in period t depends exclusively
on pt and p¯t (the largest future price) and not on the quantity of tokens sold by
the developer in period t.12 The equilibrium sequence of prices starting from period
t should, however, reflect effort and investments made prior to t, as well as the
11 This expression is an application of the equation of exchange, usually employed to link a
country’s price level, real GDP, money supply and velocity of money. The simplification is that, in
the application of this equation, I implicitly assume a velocity equal to 1: cash can be exchanged
with the token only once in every period. Of course, if cash can be exchanged for tokens multiple
times during a period, the same token can be used multiple times within the same period, which
affects the way in which the stock of tokens maps into the price of tokens for given VT . This would
introduce an additional parameter that is, however, inconsequential with respect to subsequent
derivations, and hence is omitted for ease of notation.
12 Of course, the equilibrium price will be such that demand equals supply; the point here is
simply that in a price-taking environment the demand cannot be a function of the supply.
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equilibrium sequence of future effort and investments. Hence, the investors’ demand
for tokens from period t+1 onward depends on the supply of tokens by the developer
in period t, which determines the stock of tokens held by the developer from period
t + 1 onward, and his optimal future effort and investment. To say it differently,
because the instantaneous demand for tokens by investors is inelastic to the supply
of tokens, in every period the developer can sell any amount of tokens at the market
price. But because prices react to effort and investment which depend on the stock
of tokens held by the developer, the amount sold by the developer in each period
will have an effect on future prices.
It is useful to solve the developer’s problem by distinguishing two cases. The first
is the “rich developer” case, in which the developer’s initial assets a are sufficient
to cover the optimal level of investment in every period. In this case, the cash
constraint is never binding and can be ignored. The second case is that of a “poor
developer” in which the cash constraint is binding for at least one period.
4.2.1 Rich developer.
If the cash constraint is never binding, the developer’s problem can be written as
U˜t(Qt) ≡ max
Qt+1,et,it
{
(Qt −Qt+1) · pt − it − 1
2
e2t + U˜t+1(Qt+1)
}
for t ≤ T − 1 and
U˜T (QT ) ≡ max
eT ,iT
{
QT · pT − iT − 1
2
e2T
}
.
Note that (Qt −Qt+1) · pt − it is the cash generated in period t, net of investment.
Without loss of generality, we can think of this cash as being consumed in period T .
However, because it depends on actions taken in period t, it is included in period
t’s utility function.
The fact that pT increases in eT and iT immediately implies that U˜T (QT ) is
strictly convex. The argument is quite standard: if eT and iT were fixed, then the
pT would be fixed and U˜T (QT ) would be linear in QT . However, the optimal eT and
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iT are13
e∗(QT ) ≡ argmaxe
{
f(e, i∗(QT ))
QT
(1− γ)M −
1
2
e2
}
(2)
i∗(QT ) ≡ argmaxi
{
f(e∗(QT ), i)
QT
(1− γ)M − i
}
(3)
As long as either e∗(QT ) or i∗(QT ) are positive for some QT ≤M (an assumption I
maintain to avoid trivialities), then optimal effort and investment react to changes
in QT , which implies that U˜T (QT ) must grow faster than linearly.
Consider now the choice of QT in period T − 1. For given eT−1 and iT−1, the
developer chooses QT so to maximize pT−1(QT−1 −QT ) + U˜T (QT ), which is strictly
convex in QT because U˜T (QT ) is strictly convex. It follows that, depending on pT−1,
the developer will either sell all his tokens (when pT−1 is high), or purchase as many
tokens as possible (when pT−1 is low), or be indifferent between these two options.
The price at which the developer is indifferent is
pT−1 =
U˜T (M)
M
=
VT−1 + f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
(1− γ)M −
(e∗(M))2/2 + i∗(M)
M
, (4)
where VT−1+f(e
∗(M),i∗(M))
(1−γ)M is the period T price in case the developer holds M tokens
at the beginning of period T .
Note, however, that if investors expect the developer to sell all his tokens, they
should also expect no effort or investment in period T and therefore pT−1 should
be low. If instead they expect the developer to set QT = M , they should expect
maximum effort and investments in period T and therefore pT−1 should be high. We
therefore have an anti-coordination problem, which implies that the unique equilib-
rium is in mixed strategy: the price will be such that the developer is indifferent,
and the developer will randomize between QT = 0 and QT = M .
More precisely, if the developer sells all his tokens in period T −1, then the price
in period T will be VT−1
(1−γ)M . If instead the developer purchases M tokens in period
T − 1, then pT = VT−1+f(e
∗(M),i∗(M))
(1−γ)M . Because investors must be indifferent between
13 With a slight abuse of notation, I ignore the time index when writing optimal effort and
optimal investment. I show below that these functions are, in fact, time invariant. Note also that,
under the assumptions made on f(., .) optimal effort and investment must exist. They however
may not be unique. In what follows, for ease of exposition I will implicitly assume that they are
indeed unique, although none of the results depend on this assumption.
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purchasing in period T or period T − 1, it must be that
pT−1 =
VT−1
(1− γ)M + (1− αT−1)
f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
(1− γ)M
where αT−1 is the probability that the developer sells all his tokens in period T − 1,
which using (4) can be written as
αT−1 = (1− γ) (e
∗(M))2/2 + i∗(M)
f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
For intuition, note that M · f(e∗(M),i∗(M))
(1−γ)M is the benefit of setting QT = M , coming
from the increase in the value of these tokens due to the developer’s effort and
investment in period T . The term (e∗(M))2/2 + i∗(M) is instead the cost generated
by holding M tokens, coming from the additional effort and investment that the
developer will exert in period T . Because effort and investment are chosen optimally,
the benefit should be at least as large as the cost, we have that αT−1 ≤ 1.
The following proposition shows that these results generalize to every period in
which the market for tokens operates.
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium for to < t ≤ T ). In every period t ∈ {to + 1, ..., T}:
1. Optimal effort and investment for given Qt are e∗(Qt) and i∗(Qt), given by (2)
and (3).
2. The developer sells all his tokens (so that Qt+1 = 0) with probability
αt =
1 if t = T(1− γ) (e∗(M))2/2+i∗(M)
f(e∗(M),i∗(M)) otherwise
(5)
and purchases all tokens (so that Qt+1 = M) with probability 1− αt.
3. The price of tokens as a function of past effort and investment is
pt =
Vt + (1− αt)(T − t)f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
(1− γ)M . (6)
The proposition is based on the fact that all U˜t(Qt) are strictly convex and,
therefore, in every period t < T the equilibrium price must be such that the agent
is indifferent between holding all his tokens and selling all his tokens. But this also
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implies that the agent is indifferent between selling all his tokens in period t or
holding M in every period until T . The benefit of exerting effort and of investing
in a given period is therefore given by the resulting change in pT , which is constant
over time and given by (2) and (3).
Hence, whenever Qt = M the value of the protocol increases by f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
in period t, while if Qt = 0 the value of the protocol does not change in period t. The
probability that Qt = 0 is such that investors are indifferent between holding the
token at t−1 or at t, and is also constant over time. It follows that the price in period
t (equation (6)) reflects past effort and past investment via the term Vt, as well as
expected future effort and investment via the term (1− αt)(T − t)f(e∗(M), i∗(M)).
This expression can also be interpreted as law of motion of the price, because it
implies that, in every period t ≤ T , the price of token will increase by
(e∗(M))2/2 + i∗(M)
M
with probability
1− (1− γ) e
∗(M))2/2 + i∗(M)
f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
and will decrease by
1
M
(
f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
1− γ − (e
∗(M))2/2 + i∗(M))
)
otherwise.
Period to (the ICO) is characterize by the fact that tokens are sold via an auction.
Hence, contrarily to all subsequent periods, in period to the price of token depends
on the number of tokens sold, which is M − Qto . Again, in equilibrium investors
must be indifferent and therefore, for any number of tokens sold at ICO, it must be
that pto = pto+1. Hence, whenever to < T , the developer’s problem at ICO can be
written as
max
Qto+1
{
U˜to+1(Qto+1) + (M −Qto+1)pto
}
=
max
Qto+1
{
max
eto+1,ito+1
{
Qto+1 · pto+1 −
1
2
e2to+1 − ito+1
}
+ (M −Qto+1)pto+1
}
≤
max
Qto+1
{
max
eto+1,ito+1
{
Qto+1 · pto+1 −
1
2
e2to+1 − ito+1 + (M −Q1)pto+1
}}
≡ Q˜1(M)
where the first equality follows from writing U˜to+1(Qto+1) explicitly (under the as-
sumption that the developer sells all his tokens in period 1). It follows that the
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choice of how many tokens to sell at ICO only depends on the equilibrium level
of effort and investment in period to + 1. By choosing Qto+1 = M , the developer
maximizes effort and investments in period to + 1, and therefore the price in period
to + 1. If instead to = T , then the developer sells all his tokens during the ICO, and
then exists the game. The following proposition summarizes these observations.
Proposition 2 (Equilibrium at to). If the ICO occurs before T , then the developer
does not sell any token at ICO. It follows that Qto+1 = M with probability 1. Effort
and investment in all to are e∗(M) and i∗(M) with probability 1. If instead the ICO
occurs at period T , then the developer sells all his tokens at ICO.
Proof. In the text.
Period to + 1 is therefore the only period in which the market is open and the
developer contributes to the development of the protocol with probability 1.
It is immediate to check that optimal effort and investment between period 1 and
to+1 are, again, e∗(M) and i∗(M). In all subsequent periods, instead, the existence
of the market for tokens creates a commitment problem: the value of the protocol is
maximized when the developer holds all his tokens until T , but this cannot happen
in equilibrium. From period to+2 onward the developer exerts effort and invests with
probability less than one, which implies the following proposition:
Proposition 3 (Equilibrium to). The developer holds the ICO either in period T
or in period T − 1.
Proof. In the text.
Note that if the ICO is held in period T − 1 the developer will auction off 0
tokens, and he will sell M tokens on the market in period T . If instead the ICO
is in period T the developer sells all his tokens via the auction. Holding the ICO
in period T − 1 or period T , therefore, achieves the same outcome: the developer
does not sell any token before period T and sells all his tokens in period T . As a
consequence effort and investment are at their optimal level e∗(M) and i∗(M) with
probability 1 in every period.
Corollary 1. The cash constraint is never binding (and hence we are in the “rich
developer” case) if and only if a ≥ T · i∗(M).
Proof. Immediate from the above Proposition.
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That is, we are in the “rich developer” case whenever the developer does not need
to sell tokens to finance the optimal amount of investment.
Finally, it is easy to check that the developers’ utility does not depend on M .
From (2) and (3) we know that the equilibrium sequence of investment and effort
is also independent from M . By proposition 1, in every post-ICO period the value
of all outstanding tokens ptM is independent from M . The developer’s utility is
therefore independent from M .
4.2.2 Poor developer
Suppose now that that a < T · i∗(M): the developer cannot invest efficiently in all
periods, and the cash constraint could be binding. The developer’s utility function
can be rewritten in recursive form. For t < T :14
Ut(Qt, At) ≡ max
Qt,et,it
{
−1
2
e2t + Ut+1(Qt+1, At + (Qt −Qt+1) · pt − it)+
λt(At − it − pt max {Qt+1 −Qt, 0})} ,
and for t = T :
UT (QT , AT ) ≡ max
eT ,iT
{
AT +QT · pT − iT − 1
2
e2T + λT (AT − iT )
}
,
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the period-t cash constraint.
I make two simplifying assumptions. The first one is that the developer is active
only for three periods, that is T = 3.15 Furthermore, to focus on the role of the cash
constraint, I assume the following functional form
f(e, i) ≡ g(e)1{i ≥ i}, (A1)
where 1{} is the indicator function, and g(e) is strictly increasing and strictly con-
cave. Hence, i is an essential input in the development of the protocol, because
effort is productive only if i ≥ i. However, investing more that i is also not produc-
tive. The choice of optimal investment therefore simplifies to the choice between
two levels: i and 0.
14 Without loss of generality, I write the problem assuming that consumption occurs exclusively
in period T .
15 See Section 5.1 for a discussion of the case T > 3.
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Given this, period-T effort and investment are16
eˆ(QT , iT ) ≡
e∗(QT ) ≡ argmaxe
{
g(e) QT
(1−γ)M − 12e2
}
if it ≥ i
0 otherwise
(7)
iˆT (QT , AT ) ≡
i if i ≤ maxe
{
g(e) QT
(1−γ)M − 12e2
}
and i ≤ AT
0 otherwise
(8)
To avoid trivial equilibria in which there is never any effort or investment, I
furthermore assume that
i < maxe
{
g(e)
1
1− γ −
1
2
e2
}
(A2)
that is: there is a level of QT for which the developer will invest and exert posi-
tive effort whenever his assets are sufficient to do so. I call the threshold level Qˆ,
implicitly defined as
i = maxe
{
g(e)
Qˆ
(1− γ)M −
1
2
e2
}
Lemma 1. UT (QT , AT ) is strictly convex in QT whenever i ≤ AT and QT ≥ Qˆ, and
is otherwise linear in QT . UT (QT , AT ) is linearly increasing in AT with slope 1 (cor-
responding to the marginal utility of consumption), and has an upward discontinuity
at AT = i if and only if QT ≥ Qˆ.
Proof. By the same argument made in the previous case: UT (QT , AT ) is linear in QT
whenever optimal investment and effort do not change with QT , and is strictly con-
vex whenever optimal investment and effort depend on QT . Similarly, UT (QT , AT )
is discontinuous in AT whenever the level of wealth allows for the optimal level of
investment.
I proceed by first solving the game for given to, that is, by assuming that the
ICO occurs in period T = 3, T − 1 = 2 or T − 2 = 1. I then derive the optimal to.
16 Again, I do not index optimal effort by T because I will show later that this function is time
invariant. Optimal investment will, instead, depend on t so I maintain the time index.
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Case 1: to = 3. If the ICO occurs in period 3, then optimal effort and investment
in period T = 3 are {e∗(M), i} whenever i < A3 and {0, 0} otherwise. The price of
token is therefore:
f(e1, i1) + f(e2, i2)
(1− γ)M +
0 if A3 < ig(e∗(M))
(1−γ)M otherwise
In period 2, the choice of optimal investment affects A3 and the period-3 optimal
effort and investment. This is relevant whenever i ≤ A2 < 2i, that is, whenever
period-2 assets are not sufficient to invest optimally both periods 2 and 3. It is
quite immediate to see that, in this case, the final price is always f(e1,i1)+g(e
∗(M)
(1−γ)M ,
independently from whether effort and investment are positive in period 2 or 3. The
same logic applies to the choice of period-1 investment and effort: whenever a < 3i,
the developer will invest and exert positive effort only in some periods, but he is
indifferent with respect to which ones.
Lemma 2. Whenever to = 3, the final value of the protocol is V3 = n ·e∗(M), where
n ≡ argmaxk≤3{k · i ≤ a}.
Proof. In the text.
Case 2: to = 2. If the ICO occurs in period 2, then the developer can finance
some of its period 3 investment by selling tokens in period 2. Remember that, in
equilibrium, the price of tokens at ICO p2 must be equal to p3. Hence, for given
M −Q3 (i.e., tokens sold at ICO) the price for tokens will be
p3 =
f(e1, i1) + f(e2, i2)
(1− γ)M +
0 if A2 − i2 + p3(M −Q3) < ig(e∗(M))
(1−γ)M otherwise
(9)
Whenever A2 − i2 < i (that is, whenever the developer does not have enough own
funds to finance period-3 investment), both LHS and RHS of (9) depend on p3, and
therefore for given Q3 there are multiple equilibrium p3. For intuition, suppose that
the developer announces the sale of M − Q3 tokens at ICO. If investors expect p3
to be low, they will drive down p2 (the price at ICO), which implies that the level
of investment achievable in period 3 by selling M − Q3 at ICO may be below i,
which justifies the initial expectation. If instead investors expect p3 to be high, in
equilibrium p2 will also be high, which implies that the level of investment achievable
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in period 3 by sellingM−Q3 tokens at ICO may be above i, which justifies the initial
expectation. This can be interpreted as a coordination problem among investors.
For given action taken by the developer in period 2, investors may coordinate on
a “high” equilibrium that leads to high effort and investment in period 3, or on a
“low” equilibrium leading to “low” (or no) development in period 3. Call p(Q3) the
correspondence mapping Q3 to the equilibrium p3. We therefore have:
p(Q3) =

f(e1,i1)+f(e2,i2)
(1−γ)M if
i+i2−A2
M−Q3 <
f(e1,i1)+f(e2,i2)+g(e∗(Q3))
(1−γ)M
f(e1,i1)+f(e2,i2)+g(e∗(Q3))
(1−γ)M if
i+i2−A2
M−Q3 >
f(e1,i1)+f(e2,i2)
(1−γ)M{
f(e1,i1)+f(e2,i2)
(1−γ)M ,
f(e1,i1)+f(e2,i2)+g(e∗(Q3))
(1−γ)M
}
otherwise
Figure 2 plots p(Q3). Note that, even if investors can coordinate on one of the
Q3
f(e1,i1)+f(e2,i2)
(1−γ)M
Qˆ M
f(e1,i1)+f(e2,i2)+g(e∗(Q3))
(1−γ)M
i+i2−A2
M
i+i2−A2
M−Q3
Fig. 2: p(Q3) whenever i+ i2 > A2.
two equilibria so p(Q3) is a function, this function would be discontinuous and non
monotonic.
The choice of Q3 maximizes the continuation value:
U3(Q3, A2 + (M −Q3) · p(Q3)− i2)
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The important observation is that Q3 determines the assets available in the following
period. Therefore, by Lemma 1, the continuation value
U3(Q3, A2 + (M −Q3) · p(Q3)− i2)
is strictly convex in Q3 only for
Qˆ ≤ Q3 ≤ Q2 − i2 + i− A2
p(Q3)
and is linearly increasing in Q3 otherwise, with a downward discontinuity at M −
i2+i−A2
p(Q3)
, given by the minimum number of tokens that the developer needs to sell
in order to achieve i in period 3. Of course, because p(Q3) is a correspondence,
the point of discontinuity of the continuation value depends on which equilibrium
is expected to emerge. See Figure 3 for a graphical representation.
Q3
U3(Q3, A2 + (M −Q3) · p(Q3)− i2)
M − i2+i−A2
p(Q3)Qˆ M
Fig. 3: Continuation value as a function of Q3.
Lemma 3. Define
Q∗3 = M −
max{i2 + i− A2, 0}
p(Q∗3)
(10)
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as the largest Q3 such that the developer can invest i in period 3. If Q∗3 > Qˆ the
developer chooses Q3 = Q∗3; there are positive investment and effort in period 3.
If instead Q∗3 ≤ Qˆ then the developer is indifferent between any Q3; there are no
investment nor effort in period 3. When A2 − i2 < i¯ multiple equilibria are possible
and Q∗3 may not be unique. When A2−i2 ≥ i¯ the equilibrium is unique and Q∗3 = M .
The possibility of multiple equilibria arises from the fact that the right hand side
of (10) may be neither monotonic nor continuous. That is, even assuming that the
investors can solve their coordination problem and therefore p(Q3) is unique, there
is an additional coordination problem between developer and investors giving rise
to multiple equilibrium Q∗3. Suppose that A2 − i2 < i, so that the developer needs
to sell some tokens at ICO in order to finance future development. If the price in
period 3 is expected to be high, so will be period-2 price and, as a consequence, the
developer needs to sell fewer tokens in order to achieve i3 = i. Because he can hold
a large fraction of tokens, future effort will be high, which implies that today’s price
for token should be large. Similarly, if period-3 price is expected to be low, price at
ICO will be low, and the developer needs to sell a large fraction of his tokens, which
implies that future effort will be low, and so is today’s price. If instead A2 − i2 ≥ i
then the developer does not need to sell any token to finance his future investment
and, as a consequence, in the unique equilibrium Q∗3 = M .
Consider now optimal investment and effort in period 1 and 2. It is easy to see
that optimal effort is again given by (7). The choice of optimal investment, instead,
has an inter-temporal element to consider: for given initial assets, the choice of
period 1 and period 2 investment affects the equilibrium at ICO and therefore Q∗3.
This is relevant whenever a < 2i, in which case the developer may choose not to
invest in periods 1 or 2, so to set Q3 = M .
It is, however, easy to show that postponing investment is never optimal. Sup-
pose that 2i ≤ a < 3i. If the developer invests in the first two periods, then total
utility is
2 · g∗(M) + g∗(Q∗3)
(1− γ)M M − (e
∗(M))2 − 1
2
(e∗(g∗(Q∗3))
2.
if instead the developer does not invest in either period 1 or 2, he can set Q3 = M
and achieve utility
2 · g∗(M)
(1− γ)MM − (e
∗(M))2.
Comparing the above two expressions, it is clear that the developer is better off by
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using his own funds for investing in period 1 and 2, and then financing period-3
investment via the sale of tokens at ICO.
Lemma 4. In equilibrium, the value of the protocol in period T = 3 is
V3 =
3g∗(M) if a ≥ 3ing∗(M) + g∗(Q∗3) otherwise
where n ≡ argmaxk≤2{k · i ≤ a} and Q∗3 is defined in Lemma 3.
Proof. In the text.
Corollary 2. The developer prefers to hold the ICO in period 2 than in period 3,
strictly so when a < 3i.
Remember that in the “rich developer” case, the developer is indifferent between
holding the ICO in the last period or the previous one because, in either case, he will
not sell any token before period T . If instead the developer does not have enough
funds to finance the efficient level of investment in all periods, he strictly prefers to
hold the ICO in the second to last period of the game. Doing so, he can raise some
funds at ICO and invest efficiently in the last period of the game.
Case 3: to = 1. If the ICO occurred in period 1, then in period 2 there is a market
for tokens. Let’s start by considering the choice of Q3, that is, of how many tokens
to sell or buy in period 2. For given p2, the continuation utility as a function of Q3
is:
U3(Q3, A2 + (Q2 −Q3) · p2 − i2) + λ2(A2 − i2 − p2 max {Q3 −Q2, 0})
There are similarities with the previous case (i.e., the case of an ICO in period
2). Also here the choice of Q3 determines the assets available in the following period.
As a consequence, the continuation value
U3(Q3, A2 + (Q2 −Q3) · p2 − i2)
is strictly convex in Q3 only for
Qˆ ≤ Q3 ≤ Q2 − i2 + i− A2
p2
and is linearly increasing in Q3 otherwise, with a downward discontinuity at Q2 −
i2+i−A2
p2
.
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There are however two important differences with the previous case. The first
one is that, here, the developer could have sold some tokens at ICO, and therefore
it is possible that Q2 < M . It follows that the period-2 cash constraint may be
binding. With this respect, note that if the cash constraint in period 2 is binding,
then A3 = 0 and the cash constraint in period 3 is binding. Conversely, if the period
3 cash constraint is binding we have A3 = i, which implies that the period 2 cash
constraint is not binding. Hence, in solving for Q3, the only constraint that needs
to be taken into consideration is the period-3 cash constraint.
Second, and most importantly, because investors are price takers, then the mar-
ket price in period 2 does not depend on Q3. Only period-3 price depends on Q3,
leading to the same type of anti-coordination problem discussed in the “rich devel-
oper” case.
Proposition 4 (Equilibrium in period 2). Define
Q∗3 ≡ min
{
Q2 − i2 + i− A2
p2
,M
}
.
as the largest Q3 that allows the developer to set i3 = i. If Q∗ ≤ Qˆ, then the
developer is indifferent between holding any level of Q3. Effort and investment in
period 3 are zero, so that p3 = p2 = V2(1−γ)M .
If instead Q∗ > Qˆ, then, in equilibrium, the developer is indifferent between
setting Q3 = 0 and setting Q3 = Q∗3. He sets Q3 = 0 with probability
α2 =
(
1
2
(e∗(Q∗3)
2 + i
)(
Q∗3 ·
g(e∗(Q∗3)
(1− γ)M
)−1
The equilibrium price is
p2 =
V2 + (1− α2)g(e∗(Q∗3))
(1− γ)M
The equilibrium always exists. If A2 − i2 ≤ i multiple equilibria are possible,
while if A2 − i2 > i the equilibrium is always unique.
For intuition, remember that the developer has incentives to invest and exert
effort in period 3 only if Q3 > Qˆ. Whether Q3 > Qˆ is attainable depends on
the cash constraint. If this constraint is tight, Q3 ≤ Qˆ and no level of Q3 that is
attainable will generate sufficient incentives and hence there will be no development
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in period 3. If instead the cash constraint is sufficiently loose, then Q3 > Qˆ and
for some level of Q3 there will be positive effort and investment in period 3. In
this case, there is the same anti-coordination problem discussed in the previous
section. The equilibrium is again in mixed strategies, with the developer either
selling everything and setting Q3 = 0 or holding the maximum number of tokens,
which is the minimum between the one at which period-3 cash constraint is binding
and M .
Interestingly, next to this anti-coordination problem here there is the same co-
ordination problem discussed for the case to = 2. Whenever A2− i2 ≤ i, there could
be an equilibrium in which p2 is high, which implies that the developer needs to
sell few tokens to finance future investment, and therefore period-3 effort is high.
Next to this equilibrium, there could be one in which p2 is low, which implies that
the developer needs to sell many tokens to finance future investment, and therefore
period-3 effort is low. We therefore could have multiple mixed strategy equilibria,
each of them corresponding to a different Q∗3 and a different p2.
To illustrate the possibility of multiple mixed-strategy equilibria, assume that
no development occurred before period 3 (so that V2 = 0), and that A2 = 0. If p2 is
zero, then the developer cannot make any investment in period 3. Effort will be zero
and therefore there will be no development in period T , which implies that p2 = 0
is an equilibrium.17 If instead p2 is strictly positive, then by selling some tokens the
developer can finance future investment and generate positive future effort. For i
sufficiently low, a second equilibrium in which Q∗3 > 0 and development occurs with
positive probability exists.
If instead A2 − i2 > i then the developer does not need to sell any token to
achieve i3 = i, and the coordination problem discussed above is absent. The price
for tokens determines how many additional tokens the developer can purchase and
therefore future effort. If the price is low then he will be able to purchase many
tokens and his future effort will be high. But then today’s price should be large.
Similarly, if the price in period 2 is high, then the developer cannot purchase many
additional tokens, and future effort will be low, which implies that period 2’s price
should be low. There is a unique price such that investors expectation coincide with
the developer’s actions, and therefore there is a unique mixed strategy equilibrium.
Consider now the choice of optimal effort and investment in period 2. Because
17 Interestingly, the equilibrium is in pure strategy. This is the degenerate case of the more
general class of equilibria described in Proposition 4.
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the developer is indifferent between selling all his tokens in period 2 or holding Q∗3,
I can write
U2(Q2, A2) = Q2p2 − 1
2
e2 + i2 + λ2(A2 − i2)
where A2 = a− i1 and
p2 =
V2 + (1− α2)g(e∗(Q∗3))
(1− γ)M
=
V1 + f(e2, i2) + g(e
∗(Q∗3))
(1− γ)M +
g(e
∗(Q∗3))
(1−γ)M −
1
2(e∗(Q∗3))
2
+i
Q∗3
if Q∗3 > Qˆ
0 otherwise
The choice of optimal e2 is again given by (7). The choice of optimal i2 instead
has an additional consideration because the choice of i2 affects Q∗3. That is, the
developer may want to set i2 = 0 even if A2 ≥ i and Q2 > Qˆ so to achieve a
higher Q3. Without solving the full problem, I simply note that, because of these
intertemporal considerations, the optimal i2 is different from (8). Despite this, it is
possible to characterize the developer’s choice of Q2, that is, how many tokens to
sell at ICO.
Proposition 5. At ICO, the developer sells just enough token so that i2 = i. If
investment is always zero for all Q2, than the agent is indifferent between any Q2.
There could be multiple equilibria.
The above proposition is based on the fact that, for given i2, the developer will
undo in period 2 whatever choice was made at ICO. The reason is that the price at
ICO must be equal to the price post ICO, and therefore the developer is indifferent
between selling tokens at ICO or during the following period. It follows that the
choice of how many tokens to sell at ICO affects exclusively effort and investment
in the following period.
We can now compare the equilibrium in case to = 2 and to = 1. In making this
comparison, the important observation is that when to = 1 development in period 3
will happen only with probability between zero and one. Let us assume that a > i so
that the developer can self finance investment in period 1 (the argument is the same
for the other case). In case to = 2 and a ≥ 2i, the developer will set i1 = i2 = i3 = i
with probability 1, and therefore to = 2 is preferred to to = 3. If instead a < 2i,
then when to = 2 the developer will invest for sure in periods 1 and 3 (or 2 and 3)
and will not invest in remaining period. If instead to = 2, the developer will invest
for sure in periods 1 and 2, and will invest with positive probability in period 3.
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Proposition 6. If a ≥ 2i then the developer holds the ICO in period 2. Otherwise
the developer holds the ICO in period 1.
Proof. In the text.
To summarize, the developer uses his own resources to invest until they are
depleted, and only after they are depleted he will hold the ICO.
To conclude, note that, also here, the developer’s payoff does not depend on M .
Fix for every period the share of the total stock of tokens held by the developer.
Given this sequence, the level of effort and the incentive to set positive investment
in every period are independent from M . This also implies that, the value of all
outstanding tokens ptM does not depend on M but only on the share of tokens
held by the developer in every period. In addition, Lemma 3, Proposition 4 and 5,
show that the equilibrium share of tokens held by the developer in a given period
depends on the share of tokens held in the previous period and on the total value of
outstanding tokens. All the relevant quantities are, therefore, invariant to changes
in M .
5 Discussion
5.1 Poor developer, T > 3.
In the poor developer case, whenever T > 3 and the ICO happens in period T ,
T − 1 or T − 2, all results derived for the case T = 3 continue to hold. Whenever
the ICO occurs before period T − 2, the only difference with the case T = 3 is
that the market for tokens will be open for additional periods. Note, however, that
the basic anti-coordination problem discussed earlier applies during these periods as
well: any time before T in which the market for tokens is open the equilibrium is
in mixed strategy, and the probability that the developer develops the platform in
the following period is less than 1. If instead the developer does not hold the ICO
and has sufficient funds to invest i¯, he can achieve the efficient level of effort and
investments. This observation implies that Proposition 6 holds also for T > 3: in
equilibrium the developer uses his own resources to invest until they are depleted,
and only then holds the ICO.
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5.2 Asymmetric information
The results derived above largely extend to a situation in which the developer’s
productivity is private information. In this case, if the market for token is open, for
given price for token there is a threshold productivity above which the developer
wants to hold all tokens, below which the developer wants to sell all tokens. The
price in every period is equal to the expected price tomorrow, which depends on the
developer’s expected contribution to the protocol. In every period, if the developer
is more productive that the market expectation he will purchase token and develop
the protocol with probability 1. If the developer is less productive than the market
expectation he will sell all tokens and not develop the protocol.18
The important observation is that the productivity of the developer is revealed
over time. In the moment it is fully revealed, the equilibrium of the game is again
the one derived in the previous section. Asymmetry of information therefore implies
that developers with above average productivity may contribute to the development
of the protocol with probability 1 for some periods. Conversely, developers with
below average productivity do not contribute to the protocols initially. After the
developer’s productivity is revealed, he will contribute with probability less than 1
as in the symmetric information case.
5.3 Multiple, heterogeneous developers
Suppose that there is a population of developers indexed by j, each characterized
by a productivity parameter qjt (commonly known) so that effort and investment by
developer j in period t generates an increase in the value of the protocol equal to
qjt f(e
j
t , i
j
t). If all developers are “ ‘rich” (that is, the cash constraint is never binding
for any developer), in every period t the equilibrium price of the token must be such
that the developer with the largest qit+1 is indifferent between holding all tokens
or no tokens.19 If, furthermore, maxj qjt is constant over time, then the model is
18 The same argument can be made about wealth. If the developer’s wealth is private information
and affects the development of the protocol, then a developer who is richer than the market
expectation about his wealth will want to purchase all tokens and develop with probability one.
Otherwise he will sell all tokens and not develop.
19 Suppose not. Then the best developer strictly prefers to hold all tokens and exert the maximum
level of effort and investment in the following period. But then this developer’s contribution to the
protocol should already be accounted for in the current price, which implies that this developer
strictly prefers to sell all his token, leading to a contradiction.
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formally identical to the one just solved. The only difference is its interpretation: in
every period a different developer (the most productive in that period) may purchase
tokens and contribute to the development of the protocol.
Contrary to the case considered in the body of the text, now the existence of a
market for tokens generates an allocative efficiency: the most productive developer
works on the project in every period. Of course, as we already saw, this developer
contributes to the project only with some probability. It follows that holding an
ICO has an additional benefit because it allows the most productive developer to
contribute to the project in every period. Absent the ICO, instead, the initial
developer will set high of effort and investment in every period, but he may not be
the most productive developer who could work on the project.
If instead some developer are “poor” (i.e., the cash constraint may be binding),
then the most productive developer in a given period may not have enough resources
to purchase tokens and/or invest efficiently in the development of the protocol.
The developer that, in equilibrium, develops the protocol with positive probability
in every period depends partly on productivity and partly on wealth. The full
exploration of this case is left for future work.
5.4 Total stock of tokens
The fact thatM does not play any role in the developer’s problem depends crucially
on the assumption that, from period T onward, investors hold γ ·M tokens. Suppose
instead that investors hold a constant amount of tokens I in every period. It is easy
to see that by choosing M , the developer can effectively choose the parameter γ,
which therefore becomes endogenous. The developer will want to set this parameter
as high as possible (and therefore set M as low as possible), so to increase pT for
given VT . Of course, under this alternative assumption the developer’s problem has
no solution. But the point here is simply to illustrate the fact that, in general, the
way the speculative demand for tokens is determined will affect the choice of M .
6 Conclusion
This paper studies a novel form of financing for open-source software development:
seignorage. I show that seignorage is effective at generating incentives and providing
financial resources for the development of blockchain-based software. Its effective-
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ness is, however, limited by the fact that whenever a market for tokens exists, in
equilibrium there is a positive probability that the developer will sell all his tokens
and that, as a consequence, no development will occur.
Importantly, in the “rich developer” case the developer uses his own resources to
finance the investment in the protocol, so that seignorage plays a role exclusively
because it generates profits and provides incentives. In the “poor developer” case,
seignorage has the additional role of providing resources to be invested into the
development of the protocol. The comparison between the two cases shows that
the use of seignorage to finance the investment in the protocol is a second-best
response to the developer’s lack of resource, because the value of the protocol (and
the developer’s payoff) is always higher in the “rich developer” case. This observation
suggests that an external investor (call it a traditional investor) could provide capital
to the developer so to move from the “poor developer” to the “rich developer” case,
and by doing so generate extra surplus.
There could be significant constraints to the parties ability to share this sur-
plus, which may reduce the scope of a traditional investment. For example, if the
developer can default on his liabilities at no cost, then the traditional investor will
not want to contribute funds to the development of the protocol. Also, as dis-
cussed in Section 5.3, there could be multiple developers, each of them working on
the protocol few periods and then abandoning it (as it is often the case with open
source projects), in which case it may be unfeasible to contract with all developers.
Studying the constraints that, in this environment, prevent perfect contracting be-
tween a traditional investor and a developer (or multiple developers), and comparing
seignorage with traditional financing is left for future work.
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Mathematical appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. In the text I show that if U˜T (QT ) is strictly convex, then
U˜T−1(QT−1) is also strictly convex. It is easy to check that the argument applies
to all t: if U˜t+1(Qt+1) is strictly convex then also U˜t(Qt) is strictly convex. By
induction therefore all U˜t(Qt) are strictly convex. Hence, in every period the only
possible equilibrium is one in which the developer is indifferent between selling all
his tokens or purchasing all tokens, and the price must be pt = U˜t+1(M)M .
The fact that in every period t the developer is indifferent between setting Qt+1 =
0 and Qt+1 = M implies that the developer is indifferent between holding zero tokens
from period t onward, or holding M tokens from period t onward. Using this fact,
I can write the developer’s utility as the payoff achieved in case he sells all his
tokens in period t and never purchase them anymore, so that the choice of effort
and investment in period t solves:
max
et,it
{
Qtpt − 1
2
e2t − it
}
Furthermore, I can write the price of the token in period t as
pt =
U˜t+1(M)
M
=
Vt +
∑T
s=t+1 f(e
∗
s(M), i
∗
s(M))
(1− γ)M −
∑T
s=t+1 e
∗
s(M)
2/2 + i∗s(M)
M
(11)
where I used the fact that the U˜t+1(M) can be written as the utility that the
agent will earn if he holds M tokens until the last period, so that e∗t (M), i∗t (M)
are optimal effort and investment in period t conditional on holding all tokens, and
Vt+
∑T
s=t+1 f(e
∗
s(M),i
∗
s(M))
(1−γ)M is the resulting pT . Using the above expression, optimal effort
and optimal investment in period t solve:
max
et,it
{
Qt
(
Vt−1 + f(et, it) +
∑T
s=t+1 f(e
∗
s(M), i
∗
s(M))
(1− γ)M −
∑T
s=t+1 e
∗
s(M)
2/2 + i∗s(M)
M
)
− 1
2
e2t − it
}
It is easy to check that optimal effort and investment are again given by (2) and
(3). Because optimal effort an investment in every period t do not depend on t, we
can rewrite (11) as
pt =
Vt + (T − t)f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
(1− γ)M − (T − t)
e∗(M)2/2 + i∗(M)
M
(12)
Finally, from the above expression, if Qt = M , then
pt =
Vt−1 + (T − t+ 1)f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
(1− γ)M − (T − t)
e∗(M)2/2 + i∗(M)
M
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if instead Qt = 0, then
pt =
Vt−1 + (T − t)f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
(1− γ)M − (T − t)
e∗(M)2/2 + i∗(M)
M
Call αt−1 the probability that in period t − 1 the developer sells all his tokens.
Because investors must be willing to hold tokens between the two periods, it must
be that
pt−1 =
Vt−1 + (T − t+ 1)f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
(1− γ)M − (T − t+ 1)
e∗(M)2/2 + i∗(M)
M
=
αt−1
(
Vt−1 + (T − t)f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
(1− γ)M − (T − t)
e∗(M)2/2 + i∗(M)
M
)
+
(1− αt−1)
(
Vt−1 + (T − t+ 1)f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
(1− γ)M − (T − t)
e∗(M)2/2 + i∗(M)
M
)
Solving for αt−1 yields:
αt−1 = (1− γ) (e
∗(M))2/2 + i∗(M)
f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
.
Finally, the above expression can be used to further simplify (12) and achieve (6).
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose p(Q3) is a correspondence, and that the “high” equilib-
rium is expected to emerge. The discontinuity is at
Q˜′3 ≡ Q3 :
i+ i2 − A2
M −Q3 =
f(e1, i1) + f(e2, i2) + g(e
∗(Q3))
(1− γ)M
generating a continuation utility:
f(e1, i1) + f(e2, i2) + g(e
∗(min{Q˜′3,M}))
(1− γ)M M −
1
2
(e∗(min{Q˜′3,M}))2
If the “low” equilibrium is expected to emerge, then the discontinuity is at
Q˜′′3 = M −
(
i+ i2 − A2
)
(1− γ)M
f(e1, i1) + f(e2, i2)
generating a continuation utility:
f(e1, i1) + f(e2, i2) + g(e
∗(min{Q˜′′3,M}))
(1− γ)M M −
1
2
(e∗(min{Q˜′′3,M}))2
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Because period 3 effort is chosen optimally, it must be that
g(e∗(min{Q˜′3,M}))
(1− γ)M M ≥
1
2
(e∗(min{Q˜′3,M}))2
and
g(e∗(min{Q˜′′3,M}))
(1− γ)M M ≥
1
2
(e∗(min{Q˜′′3,M}))2
which implies that the two continuation utilities (the one with threshold Q˜′3 and the
one with threshold Q˜′′3) are greater than the continuation utility when the developer
holds Q3 = M and no investment occurs:
f(e1, i1) + f(e2, i2)
(1− γ)M M
Hence holding either Q˜′3 or Qˆ′′3 is preferred to holding the entire stock of tokens M
and not investing.
Proof of Proposition 4. In the text, I argue that when Q∗ ≤ Qˆ then the continuation
value is linear in Q3 because there is no Q3 for which the developer will exert effort
in period 3.
If instead Q∗ > Qˆ then the continuation value is somewhere strictly convex in
Q3. In this case, there is the same anti-coordination problem discussed for the “rich
developer” case and the equilibrium is in mixed strategies. The developer must
be indifferent between Q3 = 0 and the largest possible Q3 such that the period-3
constraint is not binding, that is
Q∗3 = min
{
Q2 +
A2 − i2 − i
p2
,M
}
.
The price at which the developer is indifferent is:
p2 =
U3(Q
∗
3, A2 + (Q2 −Q∗3) · p2 − i2)
Q∗3
=
Q∗3
(
V2+g(e∗(Q∗3,i)
(1−γ)M
)
− 12(e∗(Q∗3, i)2 − i
Q∗3
Furthermore, investors must be indifferent between holding tokens in period 3
and in period 2, which implies that
p2 =
V2 + (1− α2)g(e∗(Q∗3, i))
(1− γ)M
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where α2 is the probability that the developer sells all his tokens in period 2. Com-
bining the above two expressions and solving for α2 yield the expression in the
proposition.
For existence and (sometimes) uniqueness of the equilibrium, without loss of gen-
erality, assume that whenever Q∗ ≤ Qˆ the agent randomizes between max{Q∗3,M}
and 0. Define Q∗3 as a function of p2 by:
Q(p) ≡
min
{
Q2 − i2+i−A2p ,M
}
if Q2 − i2+i−A2p > 0
0 otherwise,
which is increasing whenever A2 − i2 ≤ i (that is, when the developer needs to sell
some tokens in period 2 to invest i3 = i), and is decreasing otherwise.
Similarly define the equilibrium p2 as a function of Q∗3 by:
p(Q) ≡ V2 + (1− α(Q))g(e
∗(Q), i∗(Q,A3)){i∗(Q) ≥ i}
(1− γ)M
where
α(Q) ≡
(
1
2
(e∗(Q, i∗(Q,A3)))2 + i∗(Q,A3)
)(
Q · g(e
∗(Q, i∗(Q,A3)))
(1− γ)M
)−1
The complication here is that, for given Q, A3 is itself a function of p(Q), which
implies that p(Q) is a correspondence. The reason is the same discussed in the body
of the paper for the case to = 2: if the developer needs to sell some tokens to invest
in period 3, then for given number of tokens sold, period-3 investment will be a
function of the price at which the developer can sell these tokens. Hence, whenever
A2 − i2 < i (that is, whenever the developer needs to sell some tokens in period 2
to invest i3 = i), we have
p(Q) ≡ V2
(1− γ)M +

0 if either Q ≤ Qˆ or Q > Q2 − i2+i−A2V2
(1−γ)M
(1−α(Q))g(e∗(Q,i))
(1−γ)M if Qˆ ≤ Q ≤ Q2 − i2+i−A2V2+(1−α(Q))g(e∗(Q,i))
(1−γ)M
because
Q2 − i2 + i− A2V2
(1−γ)M
< Q2 − i2 + i− A2V2+(1−α(Q))g(e∗(Q,i))
(1−γ)M
for all Q, the case A2 − i2 < i can be split into three subcases:20
20 The three cases emerge as a function of the three state variables Q2, V2 and A2 − i2. For ease
of exposition, I describe them solely in terms of V2, although for Q2 > Qˆ but sufficiently low, the
three cases will indeed emerge as a function of V2 exclusively.
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1. (“high V2”) Whenever Q2 − i2+i−A2V2
(1−γ)M
> Qˆ then for some Q we have p(Q) ={
V2
(1−γ)M ,
V2+(1−α(Q))g(e∗(Q,i))
(1−γ)M
}
. That is, there are situations in which for given
Q∗3, if p2 is low the developer will not have enough funds to finance investment
in period 3, and therefore no development will occur. If instead p2 is high
there is positive probability that the developer will invest and exert effort in
period 3. Again, this situation can be seen as a coordination problem among
investors. For given action taken by the developer in period 2, investors can
coordinate on a “high” equilibrium that leads to effort and investment in period
3 with positive probability, or a “low” equilibrium leading to no development
in period 3.
2. (“low V2”) Whenever Q2− i2+i−A2V2+(1−α(M))g(e∗(M))
(1−γ)M
≤ Qˆ, then there is no development
in period 3 and p(Q) = V2
(1−γ)M for all Q.
3. (“intermediate V2”) in all other cases, p(Q) is a function, which is equal to
V2
(1−γ)M for Q ≤ Qˆ and to V2+(1−α(Q))g(e
∗(Q,i))
(1−γ)M otherwise.
Instead, whenever A2 − i2 ≥ i (that is, whenever the developer has enough own
funds to invest i3 = i), then period 3 investment does not depend on p2 and therefore
p(Q) ≡ V2
(1− γ)M +
0 if either Q ≤ Qˆ(1−α(Q))g(e∗(Q,i))
(1−γ)M otherwise
which is a continuous function.
By definition of α(Q), I can write
Q · g(e
∗(Q, i))
(1− γ)M −
1
2
(e∗(Q, i))2 − i = (1− α(Q))Q · g(e
∗(Q, i))
(1− γ)M . (13)
The LHS of (13) is equal to:
max
e
{
Q · g(e, i)
(1− γ)M −
1
2
e2
}
which is strictly increasing and strictly convex in Q. It follows that the RHS of (13)
must also be strictly increasing and strictly convex in Q. This, in turn, implies that
p(Q) is strictly increasing whenever Q is such that positive development is expected
with some probability in period 3, and is constant otherwise.
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The equilibrium of the game is a p∗ such that p∗ = p(Q(p∗)) and a Q∗ = Q(p∗).
Figure 4 represents all possible cases. Whenever both p(Q) and Q(p) are functions,
the existence of the equilibrium is readily established. It is enough to note that
the range of p(Q) is a closed interval. Call this interval [a, b]. The equilibrium is
the fixed point of the continuous function p(Q(p)) defined over [a, b]. Brower’s fixed
point theorem applies and the fixed point exists.
Whenever p(Q) is a correspondence (A2 − i2 < i, “high V2” case) we know that
for Qˆ ≤ Q ≤ Q2 − i2+i−A2V2+(1−α(Q))g(e∗(Q,i))
(1−γ)M
we have that V2+(1−α(Q))g(e
∗(Q,i))
(1−γ)M ∈ p(Q). Define
the threshold value of Q
Q˜ ≡ Q2 − i2 + i− A2
V2+(1−α(Q˜))g(e∗(Q˜,i))
(1−γ)M
and similarly the corresponding price
p˜ ≡ V2 + (1− α(Q˜))g(e
∗(Q˜, i))
(1− γ)M ∈ p(Q)
By definition of Q(p) we have that Q˜ = Q(p˜), which implies that {Q˜, p˜} is an
equilibrium.
It is quite immediate to see that in case A2 − i2 ≥ i the equilibrium is unique.
The equilibrium is unique also in the “low V2” case. In all other cases multiple
equilibria are possible.
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p
Q
Q(p)
Qˆ M
p∗ = V2
(1−γ)M p(Q)
(a) A2 − i2 ≤ i; "low V2" case.
p
Q
Q(p)
Qˆ M
Q∗3Q
∗
1
i2+i−A2
Qˆ−Q2
p∗1 =
V2
(1−γ)M
p(Q)
p∗2
Q∗2
p∗3
(b) A2 − i2 ≤ i; "intermediate V2" case; multiple
equilibria
p
Q
Q(p)
Qˆ M
Q∗
i2+i−A2
Qˆ−Q2
V2
(1−γ)M
p(Q)
p∗
(c) A2 − i2 < i; "high V2" case.
p
Q
Qˆ M
Q∗
V2
(1−γ)M
p(Q)
Q(p)
p∗
Q∗
(d) A2 − i2 > i
Fig. 4: Equilibrium in 2.
Proof of Proposition 5. Write A2 = a−i1+p1(M−Q2), and note that in equilibrium
p1 = p2, and hence
Q∗3 = min
{
M − i2 + i+ i1 − a
p2
,M
}
,
that is, independently from how many tokens are sold at ICO, in period 2 the
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developer will sell/buy tokens so that Q∗3 is constant. Hence, the choice of Q2
affects Q∗3 only via i2.
Among the Q2 such that i2 = 0, the developer is indifferent between setting any
Q2, because Q∗3 is constant and so is period-3 effort and the final price. That is, any
Q2 such that i2 = 0 generates utility Mp2, where
p2 =
(
V1 + g(e
∗(Q∗3))
(1− γ)M −
1
2
(e∗(Q∗3))
2 + i
Q∗3
)
with Q∗3 = min
{
M − i+i1−a
p2
,M
}
. Among the Q2 such that i2 = i, the developer
strictly prefers high Q2, because they generate higher effort in period 2. Call Q∗2
the highest Q2 for which i2 = i, and note that after setting Q2 = Q∗2 the fact that
the agent chooses i2 = i implies that the continuation payoff given i2 = i is larger
than the continuation payoff given i2 = 0. The continuation payoff for given i2 = i
is itself increasing in Q2 because it leads to higher period 2 effort but no changes in
Q∗3, leading to the following proposition.
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